For more than a decade, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has treated his relationship with Russia as a central pillar of Israel’s foreign-policy strategy. While Israel’s closest and most vital ally has always been the United States, the geopolitical reality of the Middle East—and specifically the military presence of Russia in Syria—forced Netanyahu to cultivate a direct, carefully managed line to the Kremlin. This relationship has often been controversial, but its strategic logic is straightforward: Israel must operate freely against Iranian entrenchment in Syria, and Russia has the power to limit or enable that freedom.
The Syrian Equation
The heart of Netanyahu’s Russia policy has always been Syria. Since Moscow’s military intervention in 2015, every Israeli airstrike against Iranian targets, weapons convoys, Hezbollah positions, or Syrian air-defense batteries happens in airspace where Russian forces are present. Netanyahu has repeatedly emphasized that maintaining “deconfliction” channels—systems that prevent accidental clashes between Israeli and Russian aircraft—is essential to Israel’s security.
Under Netanyahu, Israel secured exactly that: quiet operational freedom to strike Iranian military infrastructure next door. Even during tense periods, the coordination mechanism held, allowing Israel to continue what security analysts often call “the campaign between wars.”
Managing Russia Without Alienating the West
Netanyahu’s approach required a diplomatic balancing act. On one hand, Israel depends strategically and economically on the United States. On the other, confronting Russia directly risked losing the vital operational space Israel needed against Iran.
This balancing act became far more complicated after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Israel faced pressure from Western allies to take a stronger stance against Moscow. Netanyahu—like Israel’s other recent leaders—opted for a cautious middle path: offering humanitarian aid to Ukraine, supporting Western positions in some international forums, but avoiding the dramatic military support Kyiv hoped for.
His critics argued that this caution was morally insufficient and diplomatically risky. His supporters countered that responsibility to Israeli security—especially confronting Iran and Hezbollah—comes first.
Putin, Prisoners, and Political Optics
The relationship has also had symbolic and political dimensions. Netanyahu has frequently highlighted his ability to communicate directly with Vladimir Putin, using these ties to secure specific outcomes, such as the return of Israeli prisoners or remains held in Syria.
These highly publicized achievements bolstered his image domestically as a leader capable of navigating powerful global actors. At the same time, opponents accused him of overpersonalizing foreign policy and leaning too closely toward authoritarian regimes.
Looking Ahead: Constraints and Opportunities
Today, the Netanyahu–Russia relationship sits at a crossroads. Russia’s deeper alignment with Iran, including supplying drones and military technology, complicates the security calculus. At the same time, Russia still effectively controls the Syrian airspace universe that Israel needs to operate within.
Israel may not prefer this relationship—but it cannot ignore it. Until Russia withdraws from Syria or significantly reduces its footprint, any Israeli government must maintain some channel to Moscow. Netanyahu’s long-standing personal relationship with Russian leadership provides continuity, but it also comes with political and moral complications that Israel will need to navigate carefully.
Conclusion
The “Netanyahu Russia” chapter is not a side story—it is a central thread in Israel’s modern security strategy. It reflects the complex reality in which Israel operates: dependent on the United States, threatened by Iran, and forced to maneuver between great powers that shape the battlefield next door. Whether one praises or criticizes the approach, the logic behind it is clear. In the volatile Middle East, freedom of operation is priceless—and for years, Netanyahu believed Russia held one of the keys.
